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Abstract 
 
Incidents involving fires and explosions present a major hazard to the workforce on 
offshore oil and gas platforms. Following the Piper Alpha Disaster in 1988, platform 
operators for the UK sector are required to submit safety cases for approval by the 
Health and Safety Executive. A key requirement of these safety cases is that hazards 
associated with an accidental release of hydrocarbons have been demonstrated to be 
as low as reasonably practicable.                                             
 
This paper aims to describe a process for estimating the expected number of fatalities 
on offshore platforms with open-sided modules using a Monte Carlo simulation 
method implemented within the SAROS (Safety and Reliability of Offshore 
Structures) software. The process involves estimation of the frequency and magnitude 
of jet fires, pool fires and explosions. This is combined with the distribution of the 
workforce over the platform at the time of the incident to predict the risk of fatality.  
 
Notation 
 
A  Cross-sectional area of the hole   m2 
Apx  Previous surface area of pool    m2 
C  Constant representing the fraction of LFL   % 
at which the detector is activated 
Cg   Concentration of the gas within the module  % 
Cs   Stoichiometric concentration     % 
D  Pool fire diameter     m 
dp  Depth of oil pool     m 
F(t)  Cumulative Failure Distribution 
Fc   Fraction of the module occupied by the gas cloud - 
Fj  Flame length of Jet Fire    m 
Fp  Flame length of Pool Fire    m 
g  Acceleration due to gravity    ms-2 
h  Assumed minimum gas cloud diameter  m 
HHEAD  Height of the head of oil above a leak on a vessel m 
Mg  Mass of gas released into the module   kg 
Opr  Overpressure of the explosion   bar 
Oprmax  Maximum possible overpressure of the explosion bar  
p  Pressure of gas within the leaking section  bar 
pa  Atmospheric Pressure     bar 
qg  Release rate of gas     m3s-1 
RB  Mass burn rate of oil     kgs-1   
tdet  Time to detection of a leak    s 
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toil  Time for release of oil    s 
u  Wind Speed      ms-1 
Vg(at)  Volume of the cloud at atmospheric pressure m3 
Wg  Mass flow rate of gas     kgs-1 
Wo  Mass flow rate of oil     kgs-1 
ρg  Density of gas      kgm-3 
ρo  Density of oil      kgm-3 
ρg(at)  Density of gas at atmospheric pressure  kgm-3 
ρo(at)  Density of oil at atmospheric pressure  kgm-3 
γ  Ratio of specific heats (cp/cv)   - 
 
Introduction 
 
The areas containing processing equipment on offshore platforms are known as 
modules. There are two fundamental types of module, open and enclosed, categorised 
according to the platform construction. Enclosed modules require forced ventilation, 
open modules are open-sided, allowing the module to be naturally ventilated by the 
wind. It is the latter that will be considered in this paper.  
 
The number and configuration of modules making up an individual platform varies 
depending on the design and construction. Each process module contains pipework, 
process vessels, storage containers and the required control systems dependent on the 
function of the individual module.  
 
The well fluids, oil, gas, condensate and water, are delivered to the platform from any 
well into the wellhead module. The fluid is then passed to the separation module 
where the water is drained, the oil is separated from the remaining fluid and 
transported to shore for refining. The condensate is removed from the gas mixture and 
the gas pressurised within the compression module before leaving the platform.   
 
Each module will contain a number of isolatable process sections containing 
hydrocarbon fluids. These sections may have the potential to depressurise or 
blowdown, routing gas to the flare. On detection of a leak on a section, isolation 
valves would close to restrict the amount of inventory available to leak into the 
module and where present a blowdown valve would open to vent gas from the section 
to the flare. Both systems function to reduce the magnitude of the gas release. 
 
The occurrence of a loss of containment is identified by either manual detection, gas 
detection or fire detection systems dependant on the nature of the event and how it 
develops. Gas detection systems installed on the platform can take two forms, the first 
detects the concentration of gas in the module by either sampling or using infra red 
beams, tripping at some preset limit, the second is a sonic detector which identifies 
the sound made by the gas release.  
 
On detection of a leak or a fire, the deluge system on the platform will be activated. 
The deluge system releases water onto the affected area of the module, with the  
intention  of  suppressing the severity of the fire or reducing the overpressures should 
an explosion occur. 
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Combustion of a flammable-gas air mixture occurs if the composition of the mixture 
lies in the flammable range and if the conditions exist for ignition[1]. The 
concentration is required to be above the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) and below 
the Upper Flammable Limit (UFL). Experimental work conducted by British Gas[2,3] 
has shown that substantial reductions in overpressure result when the concentration of 
gas in air deviates from the stoichiometric concentration. 
 
Significant amounts of research have been conducted into the characteristics of fires 
occurring in process plants. One method used in modelling both jet and pool fires was 
to consider the flame dimensions and the surface emissive power[1]. In SAROS the jet 
fire is modelled as a conical flame radiating away from the source of the leak and a 
pool fire is represented by an upright cylinder[4]. 
 
To date there have been two major incidents resulting in the loss of production 
platforms in the North Sea. One of these incidents was the Piper Alpha disaster, which 
occurred in the British sector and resulted in the loss of 167 lives[5]. 
Recommendations made during the enquiry following this disaster led to the 
requirement that operators submit a Safety Case for each offshore platform. The 
Safety Case is to assess all types of hazard, including fires and explosions, and 
requires acceptance by the Health and Safety Executive. 
 
This paper presents a methodology to model fires and explosions on a platform and 
estimate the number of fatalities in an incident as is consistent with the requirements 
of the Health and Safety Executive. Modules are assumed to be of the open-sided, 
naturally ventilated type. The methodology presented has been implemented within 
the SAROS software package.  
 
Hazards on Offshore Platforms 
 
There are a number of hazards experienced when well fluids are processed on 
offshore platforms. The hazard considered in this paper is the uncontrolled release of 
hydrocarbons combined with the potential for ignition. This can result in a pool fire 
(oil release) or a jet fire (gas release) if ignition is immediate or an explosion if, 
following a gas release, there is a delayed ignition. 
 
In order for an explosion or a fire to occur on a platform there must initially be a 
release of hydrocarbons which can take one of three forms; liquid only release, gas 
only release or combined liquid and gaseous release.  
 
Immediate ignition of a high pressure gas release within a module will create a jet 
fire. The amount of oxygen available to support combustion within an open module is 
unlimited and therefore the fire will be extinguished only when the volume of 
inventory available has been reduced sufficiently to no longer support a flame.  
 
A delay between commencement of a gaseous release and occurrence of the ignition 
source has the potential to cause an explosion. Prior to ignition the gaseous fuel will 
form a cloud within the module. An ignition source could ignite the gas cloud causing 
an accelerating flame-front to propagate through the cloud. 
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Ignition of an oil pool results in the formation of a pool fire. As for jet fires, the 
sustainability of the fire in an open module is dependant on the availability of leaking 
hydrocarbons rather than oxygen. 
 
The magnitude of an explosion will be specified by the overpressures it produces. For 
a fire the heat generated and radiated to the platform structure and process vessels is 
of concern. Flame length and fire duration are used to indicate the magnitude of the 
fire. 
 
Monte Carlo Simulation  
 
The method used to model the risks on offshore platforms is the Monte Carlo 
Simulation method. Monte Carlo analysis is conducted as an experiment on a 
computer. The method uses random samples from distributions which govern the 
physical parameters and times to occurrence of events in the process. For this 
particular model each run a starts with a hydrocarbon release and monitors the actions 
of the safety systems and the occurrence of an ignition through to the consequences. 
The results of a great number of simulations are then used to determine the probability 
distributions for the magnitude of the resulting fires and explosions and the 
consequential fatalities.  
 
The method requires the use of a random number generator to create the random 
sample in variables during each simulation. Initially the leaking section will be 
selected according to the relative likelihood of a leak on each particular section in 
comparison to the others in the module. The size of the hole is selected as a random 
sample from the hole size distribution. This determines the leak characteristics. 
 
The occurrence of many events in the simulation are specified by a constant rate of 
occurrence. The ignition rate and failure rates of various systems such as the deluge 
system are examples. In this case, the cumulative failure distribution, F(t), for an 
exponential distribution with mean λ
1 is given by: 
(1) 
 
A random sample can be taken by generating a random number, X in the range 0 to 1, 
and equating to F(t) since both quantities have the same properties. The time to 
failure, t, is given by:  
 
Xt ln1λ−=           (2) 
 
Specific conditions, such as functionality of the isolation or blowdown valves, are 
determined by sampling a fixed probability event. A random number is compared to 
the probability of an event, if the random number is greater than this probability the 
system is assumed to be unavailable.  
 
Development of the Model 
 
The SAROS model was initially developed as an analytical method for explosion 
modelling by Andrews, Smith and Gregory[6]. It has since been adapted to model fires 
t
etF λ−−=1)(
 247 
 
and explosions using Monte Carlo Simulation. The model determines the attributes of 
the initial release, calculates the fire or explosion characteristics and predicts the 
number of fatalities. The following sections describe how each of the events in a 
simulation are modelled. 
 
Hydrocarbon Release 
 
The section on which the leak occurs is selected according to the relative likelihood of 
a leak occurring on each section. The hole-size is then obtained by randomly sampling 
from the section hole size distribution. Whether the leak is oil, gas or condensate is 
determined by the specific inventory of the section and the location of the hole. 
 
Initial Hydrocarbon Release Rate 
 
Prior to detection, the initial release rate of hydrocarbons is calculated assuming that 
the inventory available for release is infinite and the driving pressure in the leaking 
section will remain constant. 
 
The gas discharge rate is calculated using the laws of gas dynamics and the 
condensate discharge rate is calculated by assuming that there is a reservoir of ideal 
incompressible fluid[7]. Bernoulli’s equation is used to model the discharge speed of 
the gas, Wg, and hence the gas flow rate (when the flow is unchoked) is given by 
Equation (3) where A is the cross sectional area of the hole, γ is the ratio of specific 
heats vp cc ,  pa and p are the atmospheric pressure and pressure within the leaking 
section.  
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K is a constant derived from γρ gKp = , where ρg is the density of the gas, assuming 
that no heat is input into the system and gas is modelled as perfect. 
 
If the gas reaches its maximum discharge speed, the speed of sound, it is assumed that 
the flow becomes choked and the flow rate is now modelled using Equation (4). 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
It is assumed that the condensate and gas leak in the same proportions that they exist 
in the section and that the condensate vapourises immediately on release to the 
atmosphere. Consequently the condensate is not considered further.  
 
The modelling of the oil release rate depends on the location of the leak. If the leak 
occurs in the pipework before the separator, then it is assumed that water will be 
present in the leaking fluid, and the mass flowrate of oil, Wo (kgs-1), will be modelled 
by Equation (5). 
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( )( )2122 oao ppAW ρ−=     (5) 
where ρo is the density of the oil 
 
The flowrate of water can be calculated by substituting the density of water into 
Equation (5). It is assumed that the water will affect the release rate on a section but 
once released will not be considered further. 
 
If the leak occurs on a separation vessel then water is not present in the leaking fluid 
and the height of the hole on the vessel affects the release rate. The greater the head of 
oil the greater the pressure and release rate will be. The head of oil, HHEAD, is 
calculated by subtracting the height of the hole from the height of the oil and is then 
used in Equation (6) to calculate the oil mass flow rate, where g is the acceleration 
due to gravity. 
 
( )( )2122 HEADoaoo HgppAW ρρ +−=            (6) 
 
Gas Release Detection 
 
The methodology accounts for three types of detection system on the platform, sonic, 
beam and point detectors each of which are modelled independently. Sonic detectors 
identify the sound of gas escaping from the section. The parameter for this type of 
detector is the leak rate above which the leak will be detected. For the platform 
modelling presented later it is assumed that if the gas flow rate is greater than 0.5kgs-1 
the leak will be detected in 15 seconds.  
 
Beam and point detectors both rely on detection of a gas cloud. Point detectors sample 
the surrounding air and beam detectors detect the gas cloud if it passes through an 
infra-red beam. The time to detection, tdet, for both of these instruments is calculated 
using Equation (7) where h is the assumed minimum gas cloud diameter that can be 
detected, q is the volumetric release rate of gas and C is a constant representing the 
fraction of the LFL at which the gas detector is activated. The equation is based on 
Computational Fluid Dynamics modelling of jet releases. 
 
Cq
h
t
g6
3
det
pi
=                  (7) 
 
For beam detectors the minimum gas cloud diameter that can be detected is 8m and 
10m is assumed for point detectors. The failure probability of each detector system is 
also taken into account. 
 
If all three detection systems were to become unavailable the leak would be detected 
manually. In this case the model requires an input to specify a maximum time to 
detect a leak if none or only one of the workforce was in the module at the time. The 
detection time is reduced in proportion to the number of additional people. 
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Isolation and Blowdown System 
 
Once a gas leak is detected the safety systems should activate. This includes the 
isolation and blowdown systems designed to limit the magnitude of the leak. Random 
numbers are compared against each valves failure probability to determine the 
functionality of each isolation and blowdown valve associated with the module. If the 
valves are working it is assumed that they are activated following a short delay after 
the leak is detected.  
 
If an isolation valve on the leaking section is unavailable it is assumed that the 
inventory from the adjoining section will also contribute to the leak. If the sections are 
at higher pressures it is assumed that the inventory from the higher pressure section 
contributes to the leak until the pressure is equal to that of the lower pressure section. 
The inventory of the two sections then combine. This being a conservative approach 
to the modelling.  
 
Deluge System 
 
On fire or gas detection the deluge system is also activated. Two parameters need to 
be specified in the failure model for this system. It has a probability of failing to start 
and a failure rate once active. The availability of the deluge system is determined as 
for the isolation and blowdown systems. If the system is available it is assumed to 
activate following a specified short delay after detection, this is the time taken for 
water to fill the dry pipework sections. It is possible that after an active period the 
system could fail. This time to failure is generated using Equation 2. The 
characteristics of an explosion are affected by whether ignition occurs when the 
deluge is active or not.  
 
Hydrocarbon Release Rate Following Isolation 
 
Following isolation it is assumed that the inventory is no longer infinite. Equations (3) 
to (6) remain valid in calculating the release rates however the amount of inventory in 
the section will now decrease over time. The subsequent decrease in the pressure, 
density of gas and head of oil will lead to a reduction in the release rates.  
 
Ventilation Rate 
 
It is assumed the module is ventilated naturally by the wind. The ventilation rate for 
each simulation is determined by taking a random sample from between zero and a 
maximum value for the wind speed. The wind speed distribution is measured for the 
platform.  
 
Gas Cloud Build-up and Dispersion 
 
Gas released into the module will form a cloud which will change in size and gas 
concentration. A conservative approach is taken to the cloud growth model. As a 
worst case the gas cloud is assumed to grow at a uniform stoichiometric 
concentration. This being the concentration of gas in air which would cause the 
highest overpressures should ignition occur. The estimation of the cloud volume at 
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atmospheric pressure, Vg(at) (m3), uses M the mass of gas released into the module and 
ρg(at) the density of the gas at atmospheric pressure. 
)(
)(
atg
g
atg
M
V
ρ
=       (8) 
 
When the cloud has expanded to fill the module, then the concentration can increase 
up to the UFL. Due to the open sides of the module, it is assumed that the cloud 
volume cannot exceed the module volume.  
 
Once the leaking inventory is exhausted then the ventilation rate is greater than the 
release rate of the gas and the cloud disperses. The volume of the cloud remains 
constant while the concentration of the cloud decreases until the stoichiometric 
concentration is reached. Once the cloud is at stoichiometric concentration, the 
volume of the cloud decreases.  
 
Oil Pool Build-up and Reduction 
 
It is assumed that oil released and not ignited will form a pool assumed to grow with 
uniform depth. Prior to ignition the growth of the pool is proportional to the release 
rate of the oil. The area of the pool, Ap, is calculated using Equation (9) where Wo is 
the mass flow rate of oil, toil is the time for the release of oil, ρo is the density of oil 
and dp is the depth of the pool. 
 
pO
oilo
p d
tWA ρ10=                  (9) 
Due to the open sides of the module it is assumed that the pool area cannot exceed the 
module area and the depth of the pool cannot increase. 
 
Following ignition, the area of the pool is assumed to increase only if the rate of 
release exceeds the mass burn rate, otherwise the pool area will decrease until it 
reaches zero. Equation (10) is used to calculate the pool area when RB is the mass 
burn rate of the oil and Apx is the surface area of the pool. 
p
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−=
ρ
    (10) 
Ignition Model 
 
Three parameters are used to specify the ignition model, the probability of immediate 
ignition, and rate of occurrence of ignition sources both pre and post isolation. Post 
isolation, the rate of occurrence of an ignition source is reduced due to shutdown of 
the electrically powered equipment in the module. 
 
Modelling Overpressures 
 
It is assumed that a delayed ignition occurring following a gas leak will result in an 
explosion. The overpressure of the explosion, Opr (Pa), is calculated using Equation 
(11) where Oprmax is the maximum value the overpressure can be, A and B are 
constants which give the shape of the distribution. All of these parameters are 
dependant on the ignition location and the availability of deluge. Cg is the 
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concentration of the gas, Cs is the stoichiometric concentration and Fc is a factor 
dependent upon the fraction of the module occupied by the gas cloud. 
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The form of this equation is established with experimental results presented in 
Reference 9. A typical plot of the resulting overpressures with and without the deluge 
active is given in Figure 1. It can be seen that the overpressures peak at approximately 
stoichiometric concentration. Activating the deluge system prior to ignition can also 
substantially reduce the overpressures.   
 
 
Figure 1 – Variation of overpressure with concentration 
 
Modelling Fires 
 
It is assumed that an ignition being present at the time of a release of gas (or oil at 
high pressure) will generate a jet fire. A jet fire will also result if gas continues to be 
released following an explosion. The length of the flame, Fj (m), is calculated using 
Equation (12), developed using the work by Thomas[4]. If the initial length is below 
2m it is assumed that the fire has not become established and is disregarded. 
 
41.0)(15 gj WF =     (12) 
 
The time period is established in the code for which the flame length exceeds 2m. A 
decrease in length would be expected after isolation, when the release rate of the gas 
has decreased. The severity of the jet fire is characterised by the time duration for 
which the flame length exceeds 2m.  
 
An ignition occurring during or following a release of oil will result in a pool fire, 
with the diameter of the oil pool forming the base of a cylindrical flame. The flame 
length, Lp, is calculated using Equation (13), derived by Moorhouse(1982) to model 
the flame height of cylindrical pool fire flames. If the initial length is below 2m it is 
assumed that the fire has not become established and is disregarded. 
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where D is the pool diameter, u is the wind speed, R is the mass burn rate of the oil, 
ρo(at) is the density of the oil at atmospheric pressure. 
 
As for jet fires the duration for which the flame length is over 2m is calculated.  
 
Modelling a Gaseous Release Following a Liquid Release 
 
Following exhaustion of an oil only release it is assumed that a section containing gas 
could have the potential for an explosion or jet fire. If the pool fire is burning when 
the leak begins the gas will ignite causing a jet fire. If the pool fire has been 
extinguished before the gas begins to leak, a gas cloud will form and the potential for 
an explosion exists. 
 
Fatality Modelling  
 
The distribution of personnel over the platform is used together with the magnitude of 
each ignition event to estimate the frequency of fatalities on the platform. The 
fatalities have been considered to occur due to four types of event; jet fire, pool fire, 
explosion or fire following explosion. Fatalities due to smoke inhalation have not 
been considered. 
 
Dependent on the location of the workforce at the time of any event, the fatalities 
have been categorised as: local, pre-muster and post muster. Local fatalities are those 
of the workforce in the same module as the event. The input file provides the module 
layout model with the resistance of each internal wall to explosion overpressure and 
fire exposure. An internal wall will fail if either the overpressure or fire duration 
exceeds the resistance of the wall. In the event of failure of an internal wall, it is 
assumed that all the workforce within the module become local fatalities. Pre-muster 
fatalities comprise the workforce distributed within the adjacent process modules. 
Failure of the internal wall of an adjoining module results in all workforce within the 
module becoming pre-muster fatalities. Post-muster fatalities are the workforce within 
the other process modules and the Temporary Safe Refuge, TR. It is assumed that 
fifty percent of the workforce will be in the TR at any one time. Prior to evacuation, 
all workforce will gather in the TR. In the event of evacuation, the workforce 
population will reduce at a specified rate.  
 
The number of fatalities due to an explosion or fire is a function of the initial mass of 
fuel in the release, the module floor area and the number of people in the module. The 
event is modelled as a fireball and the distance away from the centre, at which the 
incident radiation is a safe level, is calculated. All personnel estimated to be within 
that distance are considered fatalities. 
 
Ignition of a gas cloud occurring over 30 seconds after detection of the leak will result 
in no local fatalities as the population of the module have evacuated. If the explosion 
does not then cause the wall to fail it is assumed that no pre or post muster fatalities 
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are generated by this explosion. Failure of a wall by an explosion occurring within 6 
minutes of detection will establish the population of the original module and the 
adjacent module as pre-muster fatalities. After this time it is assumed that all the 
workforce has become mustered in the TR and has started to evacuate.  
 
It is assumed that all the workforce not evacuated become fatalities if there is no 
barrier between the TR and original module and the overpressure is sufficient to 
exceed the blast resistance of the TR. When one or more barriers exist between the 
TR and the original module, an explosion can only breach the TR if it causes platform 
collapse.  
 
Further fatalities could result from a jet fire following an explosion where collapse of 
the internal walls between the event and the TR has occurred. If the flame length 
covers the distance from the module to the TR and fails the wall, all remaining 
personnel in the TR are considered fatalities. 
 
Results 
 
The method outlined in this paper is used to estimate the frequency of fatalities due to 
explosions, jet and pool fires on an open sided offshore platform. It is demonstrated 
by application to a typical example platform structure where three process modules; 
Wellhead, Separation and Compression have been analysed. Data was input to the 
model for each module in terms of module dimensions, hydrocarbon inventory, 
failure rates and locations of valves and times to blowdown.  
 
The model was run through one million simulations and requires data on the average 
number of people in each module at any one time and the strength of blast and fire 
walls to predict the fatalities. It also requires the distance from each module to the TR 
to determine fatalities after mustering has completed. 
 
Detailed results are output for each section within a module and a platform summary 
provided. 
 
Module Results 
 
Results for the Separation module are presented due to the diversity of events that can 
occur in the module since its inventory contains oil, gas and condensate. The module 
contains seven isolatable process sections, linked to each other and to sections outside 
the module. Figure 2 illustrates the layout of the sections, the location of the isolation 
valves which bound the sections and blowdown valves for depressurisation. 
  
Two of the sections, labelled 13 and 21, contain only gas while sections labelled 32 
and 33 are very small sections which contain only oil. The remaining three sections in 
the module, 1, 2 and 3, contain both gas and oil. 
 
Explosion Results – The explosion frequencies predicted resulting from a leak on 
each of the sections are given in Table 1. These results are categorised with respect to 
the overpressure range of the explosion and leaking section. 
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Section Overpressure 
Range (bar) 1 2 3 13 21 32 33 
Module 
Total 
0 – 1  2.60x10-03 7.59x10-04 1.40x10-03 4.65x10-04 3.14x10-04 2.34x10-07 9.37x10-07 5.54x10-03 
1 – 2  1.17x10-06 4.69x10-07 7.03x10-07 9.37x10-07 4.69x10-07 0 0 3.75x10-06 
2 – 3  1.41x10-06 2.34x10-07 0 1.17x10-06 0 0 0 2.81x10-06 
3 – 4  4.69x10-07 0 2.34x10-06 2.34x10-07 0 0 0 3.05x10-06 
4 – 5  7.03x10-07 2.34x10-07 9.37x10-07 9.37x10-07 4.69x10-07 0 0 3.28x10-06 
5 – 6  7.03x10-07 0 9.37x10-07 4.69x10-07 0 0 0 2.11x10-06 
6 – 7  2.34x10-07 2.34x10-07 0 2.34x10-07 0 0 0 7.03x10-07 
7 – 8  0 0 0 2.34x10-07 0 0 0 2.34x10-07 
 
Table 1 – Explosion frequencies for the Separation Module (per year) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Flow diagram for Separation Module 
 
Five sections within the module contain gas, two of which contain only gas. The 
model predicted a frequency of 5.55x10-3 per year of an explosion occurring 
following a leak on any of the sections within the module. Section 1 accounted for 
approximately 47% of the total explosions within the module. Section 3 had the 
second highest frequency, accounting for 25% of the explosions.  
 
Analysis of these results show that the sections containing gas at the highest pressures 
did not generate the largest number of explosions. It can be reasoned that a higher 
pressure within a section will generate a higher gas release rate into the module, and 
therefore the concentration of the accumulated gas cloud quickly exceeds the UFL. 
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The largest proportion of explosions was those with an overpressure between 0 and 1 
bar; 5.54x10-3 per year, accounting for over 99% of all explosions.  
 
Jet Fire Results - Two aspects of fires are considered by the model; the initial flame 
length and the length of time that the fire burns with a flame length of over two 
metres. The results for initial flame length for jet fires is presented within Table 2 and 
for fire duration in Table 3. The frequency of each event is again presented for each 
section that the leak indicates. 
 
The model predicts a frequency of 2.94x10-2 per year of a jet fire occurring in all 
sections in the Separation Module. 
 
Section Initial 
Flame 
Length (m) 
1 2 3 13 21 32 33 
Module 
Total 
0 – 10  6.24x10-03 1.92x10-03 3.18x10-03 7.87x10-04 6.21x10-04 2.84x10-03 2.27x10-03 1.78x10-02 
10 – 20  4.10x10-04 2.42x10-04 4.22x10-04 4.08x10-04 1.64x10-04 1.77x10-04 1.43x10-04 1.97x10-03 
20 – 30  2.09x10-04 6.09x10-05 1.12x10-04 1.83x10-04 9.00x10-05 6.54x10-05 5.04x10-05 7.71x10-04 
30 – 40  7.03x10-05 6.84x10-05 1.26x10-04 1.05x10-04 1.97x10-05 4.26x10-05 3.61x10-05 4.68x10-04 
40 – 50  5.15x10-05 2.88x10-05 6.02x10-05 4.48x10-05 8.90x10-06 3.12x10-05 2.86x10-05 2.53x10-04 
50 – 60  3.19x10-05 1.85x10-05 3.66x10-05 1.90x10-05 1.57x10-05 2.34x10-05 1.80x10-05 1.63x10-04 
60 – 70  2.65x10-05 1.52x10-05 2.37x10-05 1.80x10-05 1.83x10-05 1.27x10-05 9.14x10-06 1.23x10-04 
70 – 80  2.18x10-05 1.15x10-05 1.48x10-05 6.09x10-06 9.61x10-06 7.73x10-06 8.44x10-06 8.13x10-05 
80 – 90  2.48x10-05 4.92x10-06 1.20x10-05 1.55x10-05 7.97x10-06 1.29x10-05 8.91x10-06 8.69x10-05 
90+ 1.67x10-03 1.94x10-04 2.97x10-04 1.28x10-04 1.13x10-04 2.95x10-05 2.33x10-03 7.68x10-03 
Table 2 – Frequencies of jet fire initial flame lengths for Separation Module (per year) 
 
Section Fire 
Duration (s) 1 2 3 13 21 32 33 
Module 
Total 
0.0 – 7.2 8.33x10-03 2.35x10-03 3.68x10-03 1.39x10-03 9.24x10-04 6.17x10-03 4.90x10-03 2.77x10-02 
7.2 – 14.4 2.15x10-04 1.21x10-04 3.10x10-04 1.05x10-04 6.44x10-05 0 0 8.15x10-04 
14.4 – 21.6 1.92x10-04 7.97x10-05 2.50x10-04 1.40x10-04 6.75x10-05 0 0 7.28x10-04 
21.6 – 28.8 1.52x10-05 5.62x10-06 5.08x10-05 2.23x10-05 1.17x10-05 0 0 1.06x10-04 
28.8 – 36.0 2.34x10-07 0 2.34x10-07 1.64x10-06 4.69x10-07 0 0 2.58x10-06 
36.0 – 72.0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 
72.0 – 144.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
144.0 – 216.0 0 0 0 2.34x10-07 0 0 0 2.34x10-07 
216.0 – 288.0 0 0 0 2.34x10-07 0 0 0 2.34x10-07 
288.0+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 3 – Frequencies of jet fire durations for Separation Module (per year) 
 
Section 1 generated the greatest frequency of fires accounting for approximately 30% 
of jet fires. Section 21, containing the lowest volume of gas, generated the fewest jet 
fires. Sections 32 and 33, although containing only oil, generated the second and third 
highest numbers of fires. This can be explained due to the assumption in the model 
that ignition of a oil release at a high pressure can be treated in the same way as a jet 
fire.  
 
Each section generated fires with initial flame lengths between 0 and 100m in length. 
Overall, the greatest proportion of jet fires (over 60%) occurred with an initial flame 
length between 0 and 10m. 26% of the fires occurred with an initial flame length of 
over 90m.  
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Approximately 94% of the fires had a duration of between 0 and 7.2 seconds. The 
relatively short durations of the fires is due to the effectiveness of the detection 
systems in activating the isolation and blowdown valves.  
 
Pool Fire Results – As for jet fires, the initial flame length (Table 4) and the duration 
at which the flame of the fire is over 2 metres in length (Table 5) are estimated for 
pool fires.  
 
The model predicts a frequency of 8.35x10-03 of a pool fire occurring within the 
Module per year. 
 
Section Initial 
Flame 
Length (m) 
1 2 3 13 21 32 33 
Module 
Total 
0 – 10  1.77x10-03  0 0 0 0 3.66x10-03 
 
2.92x10-03 8.35x10-03 
10+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 4 – Frequencies of pool fire initial flame lengths for Separation Module (per 
year) 
 
Section Fire Duration 
(s) 1 2 3 13 21 32 33 
Module 
Total 
0.0 – 7.2 1.33x10-3 0 0 0 0 2.67x10-3 2.25x10-3 6.25x10-3 
7.2 – 14.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14.4 – 21.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21.6 – 28.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28.8 – 36.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36.0 – 72.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
72.0 – 144.0 2.34x10-7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.34x10-7 
144.0 – 216.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.0 – 288.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
288.0+ 4.40x10-4 0 0 0 0 9.91x10-4 6.72x10-4 2.10x10-3 
Table 5 –Frequencies of pool fire durations for Separation Module (per year) 
 
The SAROS results show that pool fires were only generated from a leak occurring on 
3 sections, although five sections within the module contained oil. For the remaining 
two sections oil leaks occurring produced an initial flame length which was below 2m 
and therefore a fire was not considered to have been established. Sections 32 and 33 
contained only oil, and as expected resulted in the two highest frequencies of pool 
fires. Section 33 generated the highest pool fire frequency overall, and also the longest 
initial flame length. 
 
All pool fires occurring within the module had a flame length of less than 10m and the 
majority of the fires had a duration of less than 7.2 seconds.  
 
Platform Results 
 
The results from the Separation, Compression and Wellhead modules were combined 
to provide overall predictions for the platform. Table 6 shows the percentage of each 
incident type occurring within each of the modules. The Separation, Compression and 
Wellhead modules consist of 7, 13 and 6 sections respectively, each containing gas 
and/or oil.  
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Ten of the sections within the Compression module contain only gas and 3 contain 
both oil and gas. The Wellhead module consists of 3 modules containing only gas and 
3 containing oil and gas.  
 
Event Module Total Module 
Explosion Jet Fire Pool Fire  
Separation 23.089 30.606 99.982 33.707 
Compression 53.336 49.917 0.018 47.314 
Wellhead 23.575 19.477 0.000 18.979 
Table 6 – Proportions of events occurring within each module 
 
Explosions accounted for approximately 19% of the total incidents on the module. 
The majority of explosions on the platform occurred with an overpressure of between 
0 and 1 bar and the most severe explosions originated within the Separation module. 
This is due to the effectiveness of the detection and deluge systems installed on the 
platform.  
 
Approximately 75% of incidents were jet fires. The majority of fires occurred with an 
initial flame length of up to 10 metres and a duration of up to 7.2 seconds.  
 
Pool fires accounted for 6.5% of all incidents on the platform. The majority of pool 
fires were generated in the Separation module. 
 
Fatality Results 
 
The frequency of fatalities is estimated for each module of the platform, dependent on 
whether an explosion, immediate ignition jet fire, jet fire following an explosion  or 
pool fire has occurred. Table 7 presents the percentages of fatalities occurring due to 
each incident type.  
 
Event Module 
Explosion ImmIgn 
Jet Fire 
Jet fire after 
explosion 
Pool Fire 
Section Total 
Separation 21.149 24.364 32.769 99.998 24.870 
Compression 57.133 55.939 50.020 0.002 54.747 
Wellhead 21.717 19.697 17.211 0.000 20.384 
Table 7 – Proportions of fatalities occurring within each module 
 
A total frequency of 4.768x10-02 fatalities per year was estimated for the platform. 
The Compression module generated the highest number of fatalities and Wellhead 
module the lowest. This reflects the results for the total number of events occurring 
within each of these modules.  
 
Explosions generated the highest frequency of fatalities, approximately 70% of the 
total number, followed by immediate ignition jet fires (~25%), pool fires (~3%) and 
jet fires following explosions (~2%). Comparison of these results with Table 6 
demonstrates that on average, more fatalities are generated by an explosion than by a 
jet fire. In fact further investigation of the results showed that explosions were the 
only events severe enough generate post-muster fatalities. Pool fires generated fewer 
fatalities than jet fires or explosions.  
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Occurrence of a jet fire following an explosion generated the lowest number of 
fatalities. The majority of the workforce in the area would have become fatalities 
during the explosion and the escalation of the event threatens those working in areas 
away from the source of the incident.  
 
Conclusions 
 
A methodology has been developed to examine all possible outcomes following a 
hydrocarbon release on an offshore platform. The incidents of concern are explosions, 
jet fires, pool fires and the escalation of an explosion to a jet fire. A Monte Carlo 
simulation methodology used has been incorporated into a software package called 
SAROS which can be used to provide a risk analysis for input to safety cases.   
 
As the platform can be broken down into isolatable process sections, the methodology 
can be used to determine where the significant contribution to the explosion or fire 
hazard is located. This could be used to demonstrate methods of reducing hazards and 
assess optimum platform design with respect to minimising fatalities.  
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